

ICIP REPORT

1 April 1975 to 31 March 1976

CANARY EFFORT: (OACSI Revalidation - 4 Feb 75)

a. Location: Fort Ritchie, MD

b. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None

c. Significant Information Obtained During Period 1 Apr 75 - 31 Mar 76:

(1) Confidential and conventional sources employed in the operation surfaced information on adverse suitability pertaining to 86 employees at Fort Ritchie, all of whom had security clearances and access to one of the sensitive activities supported. The suitability information included the entire spectrum in this category - alcohol and drug abuse, moral improprieties and mental instability. In these instances investigative action was taken to refute or substantiate the allegations or the individuals were removed from access to classified information. About 50% of the cases reported involved some degree of drug abuse; these were referred to the Criminal Investigation Division for action.

(2) Two separate reports were received concerning suspected Soviet Intelligence presence and interest in the activities of the supported installation. Details of these reports were provided the FBI in May 1975 In one instance an individual resembling a known KGB agent paid an unusual amount of attention to shipment of sensitive cargo to Fort Ritchie; in the second instance an individual assigned to Fort Ritchie reported that a second person whom he had met claimed to be in contact with the Soviets in Hagerstown, MD. As of 31 Mar 76, the FBI investigations of the reports were inconclusive.

(3) An ICIP source reported a possible compromise occurred when the Telecommunications Directorate, Site R, was tasked to prepare a special test tape containing test messages which could be used for coding and to devise compatibility between two computer systems. The test tape, though it consisted only of innocuous, unclassified messages, also contained fragments of sensitive, highly classified messages which had been picked up from residual magnetism on the reels of the equipment when the messages were recorded. This latter condition was not discovered until processing to make the systems compatible took place, after the tape had laim unsecured, in open storage, for about six weeks. A command investigation of the incident followed and a determination was made that apparently a compromise had not occurred, but as a result of the incident, changed security procedures were put into effect for the handling and storage of computer tapes, reels, and discs.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON SEP -5 1997 BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R

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(4 (U))Two possible SAEDA approaches to soldiers stationed at Fort Ritchie in January 1976 are currently under investigation by USAINTA and the FBI. Reports of a Fort Ritchie NCO Club bartender professing to be employed by the "CIA" and "military intelligence" are currently being investigated by USAINTA.

(5)(1) In March 1976, an Army NCO assigned sensitive duties at Fort Ritchie volunteered that he had contacted by letter an agency of the East German Government. The NCO desired to make the matter of the contact part of official records in the event he should be later contacted by any agency or person from East Germany. Though the NCO's action was part of his research of his family history and ostensibly is an overt, sincere effort on his part, the East German Intelligence Services (EGIS) often take such opportunities to make intelligence approaches, especially if the US soldier-target has special clearances and access to sensitive information. The NCO is under instructions to report any responses to his letter.

de Operational Status:

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(1(1)CANARY EFFORT was first approved for implementation by OACSI, DA, on 11 June 1965.

 $(2 \{\!\!\!\)$ In Feb 76, the 902d MI Group selected Operation CANARY EFFORT to be terminated and replaced by an overt, direct support counterintelligence program. Supported commanders were briefed on the termination action during the quarter ending 31 Mar 76. All confidential sources used in the ICIP have been terminated. The CDR, USAINTA, and the ACSI verbally approved the termination on 20 and 23 Feb 76, respectively.

(3) (2) During the reporting	period,	b1		<u> </u>		
b1	\$80.00	in TDY	and	travel,	and	3,255
manhours were expended.	,					

(4) The Operation yielded 69 information reports and 116 other reports which were chiefly verbal reports provided to the supported commanders.

 $e(\mathcal{U})$ Comments: The ICIP at Fort Ritchie clearly has been a productive operation at a critically sensitive installation. Information obtained as a result of the ICIP and acted upon by the commanders concerned has served to strengthen the security of the installation. The 902d MI Group believes that effective counterintelligence support to the installation can be continued under an overt comprehensive counterintelligence support program, which replaced the present ICIP effective 31 Mar 76.

 $f(\mathbf{A})$ Recommendation: None.